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CHAPTER 12
Intersection of Unemployment 
Insurance with Other Programs 
and Policies
Walter S. Corson
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
A primary objective of the unemployment insurance (UI) system is 
to insure experienced workers against the risk of unemployment by 
providing limited replacement of lost wages to those who become 
unemployed through no fault of their own. Earlier chapters have 
addressed the question of whether the UI system achieves this objec 
tive adequately, and these chapters have identified some deficiencies in 
the degree to which UI provides income support to the unemployed. 
Chapter 2, which focuses on the coverage of jobs and the unemployed, 
points to the recent decrease in the proportion of the unemployed 
receiving UI, despite increased coverage of jobs, as evidence of a 
decline in the insurance value of the system. The chapter also points 
out that low-wage workers are least likely to qualify for UI despite the 
fact that they work in jobs that are included in the system. Chapter 5, 
which looks at the adequacy of the weekly benefit amount, concludes 
that, while weekly benefits satisfy the short-term needs of most claim 
ants, benefit levels may be less adequate for low-wage workers and 
those with dependents. Finally, chapter 6, which examines the duration 
of benefits, concludes that short spells of unemployment may be over- 
compensated and that an optimal system would have longer benefit 
durations.
These conclusions about the adequacy of the income support pro 
vided by the UI system are reexamined in this chapter in light of the
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fact that this system, while the primary source of income support for 
unemployed workers, is not their only source. UI is one piece of a 
larger public and private social insurance and welfare system that also 
provides some income support to unemployed workers. For example, 
jobless individuals may, depending on their age, disability status, or 
family income, receive income from public programs, such as social 
security, workers' compensation, and the welfare system. Similarly, 
they may receive termination pay from their employers or other types 
of payments from private sources as a result of their job loss.
More specifically, this chapter analyzes whether the gaps in UI cov 
erage identified in earlier chapters are addressed by other social insur 
ance and welfare programs. That is, does the existing social insurance 
and welfare system as a whole provide adequate income support to 
unemployed workers, or are there gaps in coverage that the UI system 
or other programs should address? In particular, are the gaps in cover 
age of long-term unemployed and low-wage unemployed workers 
addressed by other programs? This question raises the issue of whether 
there is adequate coordination between UI and other public and private 
social insurance and welfare programs. Are there, in fact, extensive 
overlaps in recipient populations among income support programs? 
Should UI benefits or benefits from other programs be adjusted to con 
sider such overlaps or other sources of income support?
UI's focus on income support also gives rise to questions about 
whether reemployment services for UI claimants should receive more 
emphasis. Historically, the UI system has relied on the labor exchange 
function of the Employment Service (ES) to help claimants become 
reemployed. Evidence that increasing numbers of claimants suffer per 
manent job separations and long spells of unemployment, however, 
suggests that it might be useful to provide more reemployment ser 
vices, particularly to dislocated workers. Furthermore, findings from 
recent demonstrations suggest that providing reemployment services or 
other assistance to these claimants can lead to more rapid reemploy 
ment, and the UI system has moved in this direction. The Unemploy 
ment Compensation Amendments of 1993 require state UI programs to 
profile claimants as they enter the system, to identify dislocated work 
ers and refer them to reemployment services. States have recently com 
pleted implementing programs to support this requirement.
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Two other relatively recent changes in the UI system that restructure 
benefits or provide additional services to claimants are also designed to 
promote their employment. First, beginning in 1978, a number of states 
introduced short-time compensation schemes that restructure the UI 
benefit calculation to permit payment of UI to groups of workers for 
partial weeks of unemployment. The idea is to encourage firms to 
respond to business fluctuations by shortening the work week for a 
larger group of workers than would otherwise have been laid off, thus 
promoting the continued employment of workers. Second, based on the 
results of two demonstrations, states are now permitted to provide UI 
claimants with self-employment allowances and services as a way of 
promoting self-employment as a reemployment option.
This chapter addresses these issues. It reviews the way in which the 
UI system intersects with other income support programs, to identify 
gaps in the social safety net and to examine how these programs are 
coordinated. It then discusses recent changes in the UI system to pro 
mote reemployment services to claimants and the rationale behind 
these changes. Finally, it reviews two recent initiatives—short-time 
compensation and self-employment assistance—that also attempt to 
promote claimant employment.
Unemployment Insurance and Income Support Programs
Benefit Trends
Social insurance and public assistance programs have grown tre 
mendously in the last forty years. As shown in table 12.1, social insur 
ance programs—that is, programs designed to maintain incomes for 
individuals who can no longer work because they are elderly, disabled, 
or unemployed—grew fivefold between 1950 and 1990 as a percentage 
of GDP (from 1.85 percent to over 9 percent). Public programs that 
provide assistance to low-income individuals and families also grew 
during this period although not by as large an amount. In 1950, expen 
ditures for these programs equaled .94 percent of GDP, and, in 1990, 
they equaled 2.67 percent.









Cash and in-kind benefits
Medical benefits







































































































































Public aid 0.94 0.81 1.67 2.74 2.75 2.48 2.67 
Cash and in-kind benefits 0.92 0.71 1.14 1.85 1.71 1.37 1.29 
Medical benefits_______________0.02_____0.10_____0.53_____0.90_____1.04_____1.11_____138
SOURCE- Bixby (1993, pp 70-76).
NOTE Numbers include expenditures from federal, state, and local revenues and trust funds under public law and include capital outlays and administra 
tive expenditures.
a Includes railroad and public employee retirement funds in addition to the listed programs.
b. Includes unemployment compensation under state programs, programs for federal employees, and railroad unemployment insurance, trade adjustment 
assistance, payments under extended, emergency, disaster, and special unemployment insurance programs, and employment services, 
c Includes cash payments and medical assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, emergency assistance, Supplemental 
Security Income, Food Stamps, WIC, and General Assistance programs. Also includes social services, work relief, work-incentive and work experience 
activities, surplus food, repatriate and refugee assistance, and low-income home energy assistance
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This overall growth in social insurance and public assistance expen 
ditures has, however, not been uniform among programs or over time. 
For example, programs that provide medical benefits grew the fastest, 
while the growth in public assistance expenditures for nonmedical ben 
efits leveled off in the last fifteen years. Most important for our pur 
poses, expenditures for unemployment insurance and employment 
services did not grow over this period as a percentage of GDP. The data 
in table 12.1 suggest, in fact, that there has been a decline in expendi 
tures relative to GDP in recent years, but comparisons among individ 
ual years can be misleading since UI benefits fluctuate widely with the 
unemployment rate. To address this analytic problem, UI benefits as a 
percentage of GDP were regressed on the unemployment rate and a 
time variable for the 1950-1993 period to control for the state of the 
economy. The results of this regression suggest that there has been a 
small but statistically significant long-run decline in UI benefits as a 
percentage of GDP, of about .077 percent every ten years.
Workers who become unemployed or who are otherwise unable to 
work may receive private as well as public support, with most private 
assistance provided through employee benefit plans. Data on the preva 
lence of these plans for medium and large private firms (table 12.2) 
suggest that many workers in these firms participate in income continu 
ation, retirement, or disability plans. 1 For example, in 1993, 42 percent 
of workers had severance pay provisions, 78 percent participated in 
retirement income plans, 87 percent had short-term disability protec 
tion via sick pay or sickness and accident insurance, and 41 percent 
had long-term disability insurance. Based on the data in table 12.2, 
participation in these plans appears to have declined slightly in the past 
ten years, although some of this measured decrease may have been due 
to changes in the sample frame used for the survey.
Overall, these data suggest that workers who become unemployed 
currently are likely to receive slightly less in terms of UI benefits than 
they would have twenty or more years ago and that any gaps in UI cov 
erage of unemployed workers are likely to have grown rather than to 
have been closed. However, the growth in other social insurance and to 
a lesser extent in public assistance programs could potentially fill these 
gaps or overlap with UI if unemployed workers qualify for these bene 
fits. Similarly, data on employee benefits show that substantial num 
bers of workers in private employment participate in income
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continuation, retirement, and disability plans,. These plans could also 
provide benefits to UI claimants or other unemployed workers.
Table 12.2 Selected Employee Benefits, Medium and Large Private 




































SOURCE U.S. Department of Labor, "Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Firms," Bulletin
2213 (August 1984); Bulletin 2336 (August 1989), Bulletin 2456 (November 1994)
NOTE: Comparisons between years may be misleading because of major changes in the sample
frame used for the survey
NA = not available.
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits and Termination Pay
Some workers who lose their jobs receive income support while 
unemployed through Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB) 
plans. These plans provide a supplemental weekly payment to laid-off 
workers that, in conjunction with the UI weekly benefit, equals a spec 
ified percentage of the pre-layoff weekly wage. The plans are sup 
ported through employer-financed trust funds that have been 
established in some labor-management contracts, particularly in the 
automobile, steel, and rubber industries. All states except New Mexico, 
Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and South Dakota have ruled that these 
payments do not affect UI benefit payments. 2
Workers who lose their jobs may also receive various kinds of sever 
ance or termination payments from their employers. Generally, these 
termination payments fall into two categories: (1) wages in lieu of 
notice; and (2) severance payments, which are generally based on 
years of service. As of 1994, thirty-three states counted wages in lieu
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of notice as disqualifying income for UI purposes. In twelve of these 
states, claimants receiving wages in lieu of notice were disqualified 
from UI for the weeks in which they received payments. In the remain 
ing twenty-one states, the UI benefit was reduced by the amount of the 
wage payment. Since weekly wages will in most cases exceed the UI 
weekly benefit amount, few claimants would receive payments under 
the latter provision. Twenty-two states had the same disqualifying 
income provisions for all types of severance payments.
The availability of severance pay and SUB payments to some work 
ers will not, however, fill gaps in UI coverage for the long-term unem 
ployed or for low-wage workers. While a significant fraction of UI 
claimants may receive severance pay (in 1993, 42 percent of full-time 
employees in medium and large firms were eligible for severance pay), 
these payments generally amount to a limited number of weeks of 
wages, and they are primarily available to individuals with higher 
wages, generally professional and technical workers. While SUB pay 
ments are more available to production than to professional and techni 
cal workers, they are primarily available to relatively high-wage 
production workers (union workers in manufacturing). Moreover, only 
a few UI claimants are likely to receive SUB payments (in 1993, only 4 
percent of employees in medium and large firms were eligible for SUB 
if they were laid off). 3
Additionally, the treatment by some states of wages in lieu of notice 
and severance payments as disqualifying income for UI seems incon 
sistent. There does not appear to be a rationale to handle income from 
these sources any differently than income from other private sources, 
such as SUB or prior savings, which provide support to individuals 
who have lost their jobs. Instead, just as in these other cases, the UI 
work test could be used to determine if individuals who are receiving 
wages in lieu of notice or severance payments are looking for work and 
hence are eligible for UI.
Pensions and Social Security Retirement Income
Some workers who are laid off from a job may already be receiving 
social security old age assistance or a private or government pension, 
or they become eligible for and begin receiving retirement income 
from these sources. If these workers are interested in finding a new job
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and they have sufficient prior earnings, they are also potentially eligi 
ble for UI. The question then arises as to whether or not UI should be 
paid. One could argue that receipt of social security or other retirement 
income should be viewed as evidence that the individual is not in the 
labor force and hence is not eligible for UI, even though he or she 
expresses a desire to become reemployed. Under this argument, no UI 
benefits would be paid to claimants who receive retirement income. 
Alternatively, one could contend that social security old age assistance 
and UI are part of a unified public social insurance system and that 
individuals should not receive duplicate benefits from this system. 
Under this argument, the UI benefit would be reduced by the amount of 
the social security benefit (or vice versa), so that the individual would 
receive only the maximum amount available from either system. A 
similar rationale could apply to private or other government pensions. 
In this case, one could argue that employer contributions to retirement 
funds and the UI Trust Fund are part of a unified insurance system and 
that the payment of duplicate benefits is inappropriate. Finally, one 
could maintain that there is no connection between receipt of retire 
ment income and UI. An individual who is looking for work and meets 
UI work test requirements should be eligible for UI.
Currently, UI policy regarding retirement income is generally con 
sistent with the second of these three approaches. Under a federal law 
that went into effect in 1980, benefits from social security and Railroad 
Retirement benefits are to be deducted dollar for dollar from the UI 
benefit amount, as are private or other government pension payments if 
they are made under plans contributed to by a base-period employer. 
However, states can reduce UI benefits at less than a dollar-for-dollar 
rate to account for employee contributions to social security, Railroad 
Retirement, or a pension. States can also disregard pensions if base 
period employment did not affect eligibility for or the amount of the 
pension, but this provision does not apply to social security or Railroad 
Retirement. As of 1994, fifty states deducted pension payments for 
base-period employers only, while three states deducted all pension 
payments. The majority of states (thirty-eight), however, adjust the 
deduction for social security, Railroad Retirement, and pension income 
for employee contributions; fewer states (twenty-four) exclude pen 
sions not affected by base-period work.
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Before the passage of the federal requirement, states could treat pen 
sion and social security income as they wished. During the 1960s and 
1970s, many states deducted pension income for base-period employ 
ers from the UI benefit, but many fewer deducted social security. For 
example, in 1973, thirty-five states deducted pension income, and 
twelve deducted social security. Early in the history of the UI program, 
however, the majority of states denied UI to individuals receiving 
social security. These changes over time in the treatment of pension 
income, particularly social security, reflect some ambivalence about 
whether individuals receiving social security can be considered to be 
attached to the labor market and a concern that the UI work test cannot 
be applied well enough to make this determination.
The federal requirement to deduct pension income has affected the 
composition of the UI claimant population and the likelihood that indi 
viduals are receiving both UI and social security, Railroad Retirement, 
or pension income. In 1988, about 1.5 percent of the UI population was 
age 65 or over (Corson and Dynarski 1990), while in 1978, before pas 
sage of the requirement, 4.4 percent of claimants were age 65 or over 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1979). The data for 1988 also show that 6.2 
percent of UI recipients received payments from social security or 
Railroad Retirement, and that 5.7 percent received other pension 
income (9.4 percent received income from one or both of these 
sources). Data for the general UI population are unavailable for the 
1970s, but data for claimants who received extended UI benefits under 
the Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) program in the mid-1970s 
show that the rate of social security or pension benefit receipt was very 
high among this population. Among FSB recipients, 18.2 percent 
received funds from social security or Railroad Retirement and 10.8 
percent received pensions (Corson et al. 1977). Since a higher propor 
tion of FSB recipients were age 65 or older than was true for regular UI 
recipients, these recipiency rates for social security and pensions 
should be viewed as upper bounds for the rates for the general UI pop 
ulation. Nevertheless, it appears that there has been a decline in the rate 
of receipt of retirement income among UI claimants.
In summary, the availability of income from social security, Rail 
road Retirement, or pensions provides a source of long-term support to 
some UI recipients. Since relatively few UI recipients receive income
Unemployment Insurance in the United States 515
from these sources, however, they do not, in general, fill any gaps in UI 
coverage of the long-term unemployed.
Workers' Compensation and Disability Insurance
Workers in the United States are insured through workers' compen 
sation and, in some cases, through disability insurance against the risk 
of job loss resulting from injury or illness. Specifically, separate work 
ers' compensation programs in each state and for federal employees 
provide income maintenance payments and medical and hospital care 
to workers with job-related disabilities. The income maintenance pay 
ments, like UI, offer partial replacement of lost wages, but the replace 
ment rate is generally higher than for UI benefits. Payments can also be 
made to the dependents of deceased workers whose deaths result from 
job-related accidents or occupational diseases. The majority of work 
ers' compensation claims involve a temporary total disability—that is, 
the claimant cannot work while recovering from an injury but is 
expected to recover. A small number of claims (less than 1 percent) 
become permanent total disabilities, but most of the rest are for partial 
disabilities. In most cases, benefit payments continue for the duration 
of the disability. As of 1991, about 87 percent of wage and salary 
workers were covered by workers' compensation (Nelson 1993). 
Workers' compensation payments, particularly medical payments, 
have grown rapidly in the past ten to fifteen years.
Those who can no longer work because of an injury or illness that is 
not job-related are often provided financial assistance, in the short run, 
by temporary disability programs and, in the long run, by the Social 
Security Disability Insurance program.4 Temporary disability pro 
grams, which are the relevant ones for the UI system, are mandated in 
five states—California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode 
Island—and in Puerto Rico. Most workers in these states are covered 
by Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) plans that are administered 
directly by the state or by private insurance carriers. TDI eligibility 
requirements and benefit payments are similar, although not always 
identical, to UI eligibility requirements and benefit payments. In states 
in which TDI programs are not mandated, many employers provide 
temporary disability coverage through private programs or through 
sick leave provisions. In 1993, most full-time workers (87 percent) in
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medium and large establishments were covered by TDI plans and/or 
paid sick leave, although only about half of these workers had sickness 
and accident insurance plans (see table 12.2). Coverage for state and 
local employees is similar, although paid sick leave is relatively more 
important as a benefit for this group.
Those who are out of work because of an injury or illness, whether 
temporary or permanent, that results in total disability are not likely to 
be eligible for UI because they will not be "able and available to work," 
as UI eligibility rules require in most instances. When the disability is 
partial, however, the individual may be able to work in some type of 
job and could qualify for both UI and workers' compensation.
Conceptually, one might argue that UI and workers' compensation, 
and potentially TDI, should operate in concert to replace lost income 
for a worker who loses a job involuntarily. If an individual qualifies for 
both UI and workers' compensation or TDI, it makes sense to offset the 
benefits from one program with the benefits from the other. An alterna 
tive view is that an individual who receives disability benefits to com 
pensate for the loss of one job, but qualifies for UI because he or she is 
able and available to work at some other job, should be paid UI bene 
fits. According to this view, anyone who is involuntarily unemployed 
and seeking work is entitled to UI if he or she has had sufficient base- 
period earnings to qualify for benefits.
In practice, state UI programs reflect a mix of these views. Twenty- 
eight states have no explicit offset requirements for workers' compen 
sation and presumably permit payment of UI to a worker who meets 
the able and available requirements. The remaining twenty-five states 
have provisions to offset UI benefits if an individual is eligible for 
workers' compensation. In seventeen of these states, UI benefits are 
reduced by the amount of the Workers' Compensation benefit; in the 
other seven, no UI is paid at all. This latter approach seems to carry the 
concept of benefit coordination to an inappropriate extreme. The policy 
may have no practical consequences, however, because the replace 
ment rates for the weekly benefit and the maximum benefit under 
workers' compensation exceed those under UI.
The six existing TDI programs appear to be well coordinated with 
UI, since TDI benefits are paid when an individual is unable to work 
and hence not eligible for UI. 5 In these programs, TDI benefits are paid 
when an individual becomes ill or injured, both while employed and
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while unemployed. Ten additional states have provisions that permit 
continued payment of UI to claimants who become ill or injured while 
collecting UI. These provisions appear to be a way of covering such 
workers in states that do not have mandated TDI programs. This cover 
age is unavailable in other states, however. In these states, a UI claim 
ant who becomes ill or injured is not eligible for UI while he or she is 
unable to work.
As the discussion here suggests, the number of UI claimants who 
also receive workers' compensation or disability benefits is quite small. 
Although no recent statistics are available, data from the mid-1970s 
collected for a study of extended UI benefit recipients showed that only 
about 1 percent of this population collected workers' compensation 
(Corson et al. 1977). Given the growth in workers' compensation in 
recent years, this number is likely to have grown, but it is probably still 
the case that there is very little overlap between workers' compensa 
tion, disability, and UI.
Health Insurance
The UI system provides income support to workers, but it does not 
provide for the continuation of any fringe benefits, including health 
insurance. Hence, coordination of UI benefits with health insurance 
coverage is not an issue. Instead, the likelihood that UI recipients are 
covered by health insurance and whether coverage should be made 
available to this population become important.
Although direct evidence on the degree of health insurance coverage 
for the UI population is not available, we can examine various ways in 
which claimants could be covered. Specifically, workers who lose their 
jobs could be covered by employer-provided health insurance that con 
tinues for some period after layoff. They could also be covered through 
insurance provided by another family member or by a public program 
such as medicare or medicaid, and they could purchase coverage on 
their own.
Health insurance coverage from a pre-UI job will probably continue 
after layoff, but the duration is likely to be short. Information on group 
health plans collected for the National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation and published in 1980 indicates that, at the time, about 
80 percent of unemployed workers covered by these plans could retain
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coverage for a time, but the average period was only a month (Mal- 
hotra and Wills 1980). Very few health insurance plans extend cover 
age for four or more months after a job loss. This pattern suggests that 
few long-term UI recipients are likely to have this type of health insur 
ance coverage.
UI recipients can also obtain health insurance coverage through 
other family members or through public programs, such as medicare or 
medicaid. Data on the characteristics of recipients, however, suggest 
that these sources do not provide coverage for most claimants (Corson 
and Dynarski 1990). About 40 percent of claimants have working 
spouses, who might have health insurance coverage through their jobs, 
but not all spouses have coverage nor would all spouses have elected 
family coverage. In addition, few UI recipients are likely to be covered 
by public programs. Medicare is not an option for most recipients: less 
than 2 percent are age 65 or older, and 6 percent receive social security 
or Railroad Retirement. Medicaid is probably also not an option for 
most recipients because only 3 percent receive Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or 
other welfare benefits.
The final way in which UI recipients can obtain health insurance is 
by purchasing coverage on their own. Workers who leave a job with 
health insurance coverage are allowed, through the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), to pay for 
extending their existing coverage for up to 18 months. However, many 
UI recipients are not likely to have the financial resources needed to 
purchase insurance when they are unemployed. Many had low-paying 
jobs and low family incomes prior to receiving UI. Even for other 
recipients, the cost, which equals 102 percent of the combined 
employer-employee premium, may be prohibitive. For example, in 
1992, the average annual cost of employer-provided health insurance 
in mid-sized companies was $3,865 (Johnson & Higgins 1992); in 
weekly terms this is equivalent to about 40 percent of the average 
weekly UI benefit amount.
In summary, the evidence reported here suggests that substantial 
numbers of UI recipients, particularly long-term ones, are likely to lack 
health insurance coverage. Coverage under most employer-sponsored 
health plans does not extend long enough to provide for the long-term 
unemployed. Less than half of UI recipients have working spouses
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who might have health insurance. Few recipients are likely to be eligi 
ble for medicare or medicaid. Many recipients do not have the financial 
resources needed to purchase insurance under the COBRA provisions. 
Providing health insurance to the UI population would probably best 
be accomplished through general reforms in the health insurance sys 
tem leading to more universal coverage. However, an alternative, more 
targeted approach was proposed in the 1997 administration budget. 
Under this plan, unemployed workers would receive premium subsi 
dies to purchase private insurance for up to six months with funds pro 
vided from general revenues. Individual states would design and 
administer the programs, but the details of who would be eligible and 
how the programs would work were unspecified.
Welfare Programs
Some UI recipients with low family incomes are eligible for benefits 
from welfare programs—AFDC, SSI, General Assistance (GA), and 
food stamps—or for assistance through the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), a refundable tax credit. These benefits are coordinated with UI 
by requiring applicants for welfare benefits to apply for and collect any 
UI for which they are eligible. Income from UI is considered in the 
welfare benefit calculation. UI income is also counted as part of tax 
able income used in the EITC calculation.
UI recipients may be eligible to obtain benefits from welfare pro 
grams, but relatively few do so. For example, data for 1988 indicate 
that under 3 percent of UI recipients received cash welfare benefits 
(AFDC, SSI, or other welfare), and only 4 percent received food 
stamps (Corson and Dynarski 1990). 6 Rates of welfare benefit receipt 
rose following UI benefit exhaustion (to 4 percent for cash benefits and 
7.5 percent for food stamps), but not by substantial amounts.
In contrast, a greater proportion of UI recipients receive income 
from the EITC. For example, 1993 data from the Internal Revenue Ser 
vice indicate that about 22 percent of the tax returns that had income 
from unemployment compensation programs also had tax credits or 
payments under the EITC. However, these same data show that the 
average annual EITC benefit was relatively small ($1,024). 7
The low rates of welfare benefit payments among UI recipients and 
exhaustees occur for several reasons. First, some UI recipients have
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sources of family income other than UI—for example, their spouse's 
earnings—that make them ineligible for welfare. Second, welfare pro 
grams have asset as well as income eligibility requirements that may 
disqualify UI recipients. For example, families with liquid assets that 
exceed $2,000 are not eligible for food stamps. Third, AFDC and SSI 
benefits are available only to specific categories of families or individu 
als—families with children, in the case of AFDC, and individuals who 
are age 65 or older, blind, or disabled, in the case of SSI. Finally, UI 
recipients may be reluctant to apply for welfare benefits, because they 
are likely to be newly eligible and unlikely to view themselves as long- 
term welfare recipients. They do, however, appear to apply for the 
EITC.
Although few UI recipients or exhaustees actually collect welfare 
program benefits, a number have family incomes that are below the 
poverty line or likely to be below the poverty line if UI were not avail 
able. For example, a Congressional Budget Office study found that 20 
percent of long-term UI recipients had family incomes below the pov 
erty line, and another 27 percent would have had family incomes below 
the poverty line if they were not receiving UI benefits (Congressional 
Budget Office 1990). 8 This study found further that 16 percent of long- 
term UI recipients continued to have family incomes below the poverty 
line three months after UI benefit exhaustion. Similar results were 
found in a study of extended benefit recipients in the mid-1970s (Cor- 
son and Nicholson 1982).
While not the main objective of the UI program, the importance of 
UI as an antipoverty mechanism has played a role in debates about 
extended UI benefits. The current welfare system does not provide 
much support to UI recipients or exhaustees, so some policy makers 
have argued that UI should be extended because of its antipoverty 
effects, particularly during recessionary times. Extending UI benefits, 
however, is an inefficient way to meet an antipoverty objective, 
because benefits are paid not only to poor but also to nonpoor families. 
In fact, the same tabulations that illustrate the antipoverty effects of UI 
show that a substantial share of benefits is paid to individuals with fam 
ily incomes well above the poverty line. Targeting UI extensions better 
to poor families could be achieved by means-testing extended UI bene 
fits, but this process would imply a major departure from the funda 
mental design of the UI program, which is based on an individual
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concept of eligibility. Means-testing extended UI would require that 
eligibility be recomputed based on family income. An alternative 
approach, which is used in several other countries (see chapter 14), is 
to provide UI exhaustees with means-tested unemployment assistance 
through a separate program. However, unless a separate assistance pro 
gram is developed, the current welfare system is expanded, or the dura 
tion of UI benefits is extended, the present gap in income support to the 
long-term unemployed, including low-income individuals, is likely to 
remain.
Unemployment Insurance and Programs 
for Dislocated Workers
Since the 1980s, attention has focused on the reemployment prob 
lems of workers who are laid off from their jobs permanently and who 
must find a new job. The number of these workers, who have been 
called "dislocated" or "displaced," has been sizable. For many, labor 
market experiences following layoff have included long spells of 
unemployment and a reduction in wages after reemployment.
Since 1984, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department 
of Labor has identified and tracked dislocated workers through bian 
nual supplements to the Current Population Survey. In this survey, 
workers who report "having lost or left a job because of a plant closing, 
an employer going out of business, a layoff from which they were not 
recalled, or other similar reason" are classified as dislocated. The 1994 
survey found that about 5.5 million workers were dislocated in the 
1991-1992 period. Nearly half of this group had been employed in 
their jobs for three or more years (Gardner 1995).
An earlier analysis of data on these dislocated workers by the Con 
gressional Budget Office (CBO) found that about two million individu 
als were dislocated each year during the 1980s (Congressional Budget 
Office 1993). Although the numbers were higher than average during 
the early 1980s recession,9 substantial numbers were dislocated in all 
years, including those in which the unemployment rate was relatively 
low. The CBO study also found that workers in goods-producing 
industries—agriculture, mining, construction, and manufacturing—
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and in blue-collar occupations were at greater risk of dislocation than 
workers in service-producing industries and in white-collar occupa 
tions. Substantial fractions of the dislocated worker population were 
from service-producing industries and white-collar occupations, how 
ever. Moreover, differences in the risk of dislocation for these groups 
narrowed during the 1980s, a trend that continued in the early 1990s 
(Gardner 1995).
The CBO study also showed that many dislocated workers have 
long spells of unemployment and reductions in wages after reemploy- 
ment. One to three years after losing their jobs, half of the individuals 
were not working or had new jobs with weekly earnings of less than 80 
percent of their prelayoff earnings. The workers with the largest losses 
had the least education, were the oldest, and had the longest tenure 
with the previous employer. Furthermore, dislocated workers who held 
a job at the time of the survey had endured relatively long jobless 
spells: the average duration was just under 20 weeks.
Additional studies of dislocated workers based on individual-level 
data sets have also demonstrated that worker dislocation is costly. 
Topel (1993) cites three studies that, depending on the point of obser 
vation, estimated wage losses of 10 to 30 percent as a result of disloca 
tion—that is, dislocated workers who became reemployed earned 
about 10 to 30 percent less than they earned in their predislocation 
job. 10 Even five years after their job loss, the wages of dislocated work 
ers in these studies were still about 15 percent lower than their predis 
location levels. The large loss in wages, together with the relatively 
long jobless spells experienced by dislocated workers, implies that the 
total cost of dislocation is high. This is confirmed by estimates based 
on a sample of dislocated workers in Pennsylvania (Jacobson, 
LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993). Total discounted earnings losses for 
these workers over the six years after their job loss were equal to an 
average of $41,000 per worker.
Many dislocated workers enter the UI system. Furthermore, many 
UI recipients can be classified as dislocated workers. The CBO study 
found that 70 percent of dislocated workers who were jobless for at 
least five weeks reported receiving UI benefits. In addition, more than 
half of the dislocated workers who received UI reported exhausting 
their benefits. Data from a study of UI recipients in 1988 show that 
more than half of the UI recipient population had no recall expecta-
Unemployment Insurance in the United States 523
tions at the time they entered the UI system, and about 36 percent 
could be characterized as dislocated, under a definition similar to that 
used in the CBO survey (Corson and Dynarski 1990). Not surprisingly, 
these figures were higher among UI exhaustees: 67 percent had no 
recall expectations and 52 percent could be classified as dislocated.
Dislocated workers who enter the UI system, like dislocated work 
ers in general, have longer-than-average spells of unemployment and a 
greater likelihood of wage reductions than other claimants. Corson and 
Dynarski (1990) used their sample of UI claimants from 1988 to com 
pare employment and UI benefit outcomes of dislocated and nondislo- 
cated workers. 11 They found that dislocated workers, particularly those 
with substantial job tenure, had lower reemployment rates, longer 
spells of unemployment, higher UI exhaustion rates, and a lower ratio 
of post-UI to pre-UI weekly wages than other claimants. For example, 
only 81 percent of the dislocated workers with three or more years of 
job tenure had become reemployed during the first twenty months after 
their initial claim, compared with 92 percent of the nondislocated 
workers.
Data from a demonstration program in New Jersey, in which claim 
ants were followed for six years, showed that individuals targeted for 
demonstration services—permanently separated claimants with three 
or more years of job tenure—experienced large reductions in annual 
earnings relative to their UI base-period earnings throughout the six- 
year period (Corson and Haimson 1996). This drop in earnings was 
considerably larger than that experienced by other claimants. Even 
claimants who became reemployed had substantial earnings losses; 
average earnings for employed individuals did not reach pre-UI levels 
until the fourth year after the initial claim. By the sixth year, annual 
average earnings for employed individuals exceeded the base-period 
average by $1,889, but this 10.5 percent increase in nominal earnings 
did not keep pace with inflation (the Consumer Price Index for the 
Northeast rose approximately 34 percent in this period) or with the 
average weekly earnings of manufacturing workers in New Jersey 
(average weekly earnings rose by approximately 25 percent in this 
period).
UI claimants who exhaust their benefits also have especially high 
earnings losses. These losses, at least for manufacturing workers, are 
illustrated by findings based on a sample of UI exhaustees from manu-
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facturing drawn from 10 states for an evaluation of the Trade Adjust 
ment Assistance program (Corson et al. 1993). The findings show that 
the costs of dislocation among UI exhaustees from manufacturing, as 
measured by earnings losses, were about $35,000 (undiscounted) over 
the first three years after the initial UI claim. Furthermore, since aver 
age earnings were still relatively low among the sample three years 
after the initial claim, we can conclude that the full earnings losses 
would be significantly larger if we were able to expand the post-layoff 
period of observation.
Trends in Unemployment and Dislocation
Trends in three unemployment measures suggest that an increasing 
proportion of the unemployed population is made up of dislocated 
workers. These measures include the proportion of unemployed work 
ers on temporary layoff, the proportion of unemployed workers with 
long unemployment spells, and the proportion of UI claimants who 
exhaust their benefits. The trend in the proportion of job losers from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) who report that they are on tem 
porary layoff is shown in figure 12.1. Although the series has been rel 
atively volatile between 1967 and 1994, the long-run trend is clearly a 
decrease in the proportion of job losers on temporary layoff and, 
hence, a corresponding increase in the proportion on permanent layoff. 
The trend line in figure 12.1 implies that the proportion of job losers on 
temporary layoff declined by nearly three-tenths of a percentage point 
per year over the observation period. This downward trend is statisti 
cally significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Further evidence on 
the relative decline in temporary layoffs is provided by comparing the 
average proportion of temporary layoffs early in the observation period 
with the proportion later in the observation period. The average annual 
proportion over the first ten years of the series is 32 percent, compared 
with about 27 percent over the last ten years of the series.
At the same time that the share of temporary layoffs has declined, 
the proportion of unemployed workers who are jobless for 15 or more 
weeks has increased. Figure 12.2 shows the data on unemployment, 
which are drawn from the CPS, between 1950 and 1994 and the esti 
mated trend in the unemployment data over this period. The trend line 
indicates that an increasing percentage of unemployed workers have
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remained so for at least 15 weeks. The highest rate of long-term unem 
ployment shown in figure 12.2 occurred not in recent years but during 
the recession of the early 1980s, when the proportion of long-term to 
total unemployed reached 39 percent in 1983. Nevertheless, the gen 
eral trend since 1950 has been for long-term unemployment to become 
more prevalent. The estimated trend suggests that the proportion of 
unemployed workers who were unemployed for at least 15 weeks 
increased annually by a quarter of a percentage point over the observa 
tion period; this estimated trend is statistically significant at the 99 per 
cent confidence level.
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NOTE Job losers on temporary layoffs are individuals who were laid off and are expecting to be
recalled.
The findings on UI benefit exhaustion parallel those on long-term 
unemployment. The benefit exhaustion rate, which is shown in figure 
12.3, applies only to unemployed workers who file for and begin to
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collect UI benefits. Although the trend in benefit exhaustion may 
respond to changes in the type of workers filing for UI, it is still a use 
ful indicator of the reemployment difficulties of unemployed workers 
who are receiving UI benefits. As expected, the pattern over time of the 
exhaustion rate is similar to that of the long-term unemployed measure. 
Estimates of the long-term trend in benefit exhaustion suggest that the 
exhaustion rate increased annually by an average of three-tenths of a 
percentage point between 1950 and 1994.
Trends in the three measures illustrated in the figures show that a 
growing number of job losers do not expect to return to work with their 
previous employer, that unemployed individuals are increasingly likely 
to remain unemployed for at least 15 weeks, and that UI claimants are 
increasingly likely to exhaust their benefits. These developments sug 
gest that unemployed workers are more likely now than in the past to 
face long unemployment spells with uncertain reemployment pros 
pects, and, accordingly, that more of them could be characterized as 
dislocated workers.
Programs to Aid Dislocated Workers
The federal/state system of unemployment compensation is the pri 
mary source of cash benefits for dislocated workers. Most dislocated 
workers who receive UI are also registered with the ES, but relatively 
few receive substantive reemployment services. For example, a recent 
study of long-term recipients found that just 6 percent were receiving 
job search assistance that was more intensive than simple ES work reg 
istration (Richardson et al. 1989). Rates of service receipt reported in a 
1988 survey of UI recipients were considerably higher (64 percent said 
they received some services), but a substantial number (36 percent) 
still received no services, and few received intensive services, such as 
assessment, counseling, or job search workshops (Corson and Dynar- 
ski 1990).
Dislocated workers may receive reemployment services and training 
through several other programs explicitly targeted to them. The largest 
of these, the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance 
(EDWAA) program, which operates as Title III of the Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA), provides funding to states and through states 
to substate grantees to provide training (occupational classroom and
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on-the-job training) to dislocated workers. 12 In addition, grantees may 
provide related services—orientation and assessment, job search assis 
tance (generally provided through group workshops), counseling, and 
relocation assistance. As part of EDWAA, states also conduct rapid 
response activities, to inform dislocated workers of available services 
as soon as a plant closing or mass layoff is announced. Funding under 
this program has grown in recent years, from under a half billion dol 
lars in 1990 to more than one billion dollars in 1995. Nevertheless the 
total number of dislocated workers served under EDWAA is a rela 
tively small proportion of the total number of dislocated workers. For 
example, approximately 300,000 individuals per year received assis 
tance under EDWAA between 1990 and 1993 as compared to the over 
2 million dislocated workers per year identified in the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics dislocated worker survey.
Other programs provide services to specific groups of dislocated 
workers. The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program seeks to aid 
individuals who lose their jobs because of trade liberalization. In the 
1970s this program emphasized compensating workers for lost income 
by adding a supplement to the weekly UI benefit and by extending 
weekly benefits from the 26 provided by UI to 52 or to 78 weeks for 
individuals in training or age 60 or older. In 1981, the supplement to 
the UI weekly benefit amount was dropped, as was the extension for 
individuals age 60 or older. Separate funds for training were also made 
available in 1982. These funds were expanded substantially in 1988, 
and training was made mandatory unless the requirement is waived. As 
a result, the focus of the program has shifted toward providing adjust 
ment services, and the likelihood that recipients receive reemployment 
services, especially training, has increased (Corson et al. 1993). This 
program is, however, quite small, with approximately 20,000-50,000 
recipients per year. Various amendments to JTPA have also authorized 
new programs for special categories of workers, including special 
reemployment assistance for workers who lost their jobs after the 
Clean Air Act was implemented and for workers dislocated because of 
reductions in defense expenditures. Services under these special initia 
tives are provided through the EDWAA program. A number of earlier 
programs to aid workers dislocated by federal policy initiatives (such 
as the enlargement of Redwoods National Park, railroad reorganiza-
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tions, and airline deregulation) were also targeted on specific groups of 
workers.
Despite the large number of special programs, the overall number of 
workers served by EDWAA and other dislocated worker programs is 
relatively small. The 1988 UI study data suggest that under 5 percent 
of UI recipients and under 10 percent of exhaustees receive any ser 
vices from these programs (Corson and Dynarski 1990).
Evidence from Program Evaluations
Formal evaluations of four major demonstration projects during the 
1980s assessed the extent to which reemployment services helped 
enhance the reemployment prospects of dislocated workers. Three of 
these demonstrations addressed layoffs at specific industrial plants in 
Detroit (Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer 1984), Buffalo (Corson, Long, 
and Maynard 1985), and Houston and El Paso (Bloom and Kulik 
1986). Although these demonstrations had relatively small samples and 
used different research methodologies, 13 one general finding emerged: 
the reemployment outcomes for workers who received special assis 
tance in looking for work tended to be more favorable than those for 
workers in the comparison/control groups, but additional benefits from 
participating in a training program were either ambiguous or small, rel 
ative to program costs. For example, the evaluation of the Buffalo 
project found that job search assistance had significant effects on reem 
ployment rates and on average weekly earnings, but classroom and on- 
the-job training had statistically insignificant effects (Corson, Long, 
and Maynard 1985). Because the per-participant costs of training were 
approximately four times the cost of job search assistance alone, the 
report concluded that only the job search assistance treatment was 
cost-effective.
A fourth major evaluation—the New Jersey UI Reemployment 
Demonstration Project—had a somewhat broader focus than the plant- 
based projects described earlier. The goal of the New Jersey demon 
stration was "to examine whether the Unemployment Insurance system 
could be used to identify workers early in their unemployment spells 
and to provide them with alternative, early intervention services to 
accelerate their return to work" (Corson et al. 1989). Overall, 8,675 UI 
claimants were assigned randomly to one of three treatments (job
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search assistance only, job search assistance combined with training or 
relocation assistance, and job search assistance combined with a cash 
bonus for early reemployment) and then compared with a randomly 
selected control group of 2,385 claimants who received only regular 
services. Demonstration services were targeted to dislocated workers 
through a series of eligibility screens that excluded workers who (1) 
did not receive a UI first payment within five weeks after their initial 
claim, (2) were collecting partial UI benefits, (3) were younger than 
twenty-five years of age, (4) had fewer than three years of employment 
experience on their last job, (5) had a specific recall date from their 
employer, or (6) were usually hired through union hiring-hall arrange 
ments. As a whole, these screens excluded approximately 73 percent of 
all workers who received a first payment from UI during the sample 
period.
Each treatment in the New Jersey demonstration had a statistically 
significant effect on reducing the collection of UI benefits and on rais 
ing subsequent employment and earnings (Corson et al. 1989; Corson 
and Haimson 1996). UI benefits were reduced in both the initial benefit 
year and in subsequent years. The total benefits of the treatments also 
exceeded their total costs from the perspectives of both society and the 
individuals involved. From the viewpoint of government alone, how 
ever, only the job search and reemployment bonus treatments were 
unambiguously beneficial. No clear evidence emerged that providing 
training or relocation help in addition to job search assistance led to 
cost-effective gains. Evaluations of demonstration programs similar to 
the New Jersey one in Minnesota, Nevada, South Carolina, and Wash 
ington support the notion that stronger links between UI recipients and 
the reemployment service system are a cost-effective way to promote 
rapid reemployment among UI recipients (see Meyer 1995 and U.S. 
Department of Labor 1995 for reviews).
Current Policy Initiatives: Profiling and Reemployment Services
The UI system is a logical avenue for identifying workers who 
might be helped by reemployment services, because the majority of 
dislocated workers collect UI benefits, and they usually begin to 
receive these payments early in their unemployment spells. Other tar 
geting mechanisms (such as the rapid response program outreach
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efforts under EDWAA) are important but more limited than a Ul-based 
approach, because they tend to focus on specific groups of dislocated 
workers (such as those from plant closings or mass layoffs, in the case 
of EDWAA). Identifying workers early in their unemployment spells 
has several advantages. By beginning the adjustment process more 
quickly, claimants can use UI benefits as income support during train 
ing, if training is necessary. For workers who do not need training, the 
risk of exhausting UI benefits can be lessened, and income can be 
increased through more rapid reemployment. Because many dislocated 
workers collect UI benefits for a substantial period of time, potential 
program savings from more rapid reemployment can also be achieved.
This reasoning, combined with evidence from the New Jersey dem 
onstration that long-term UI recipients can be identified early in their 
unemployment spells, resulted in the Unemployment Compensation 
Amendments of 1993, which require state UI programs to profile 
claimants as they enter the UI system so that dislocated workers can be 
identified. Subsequent interpretations of this requirement by the U.S. 
Department of Labor provide guidance on how states should imple 
ment a profiling mechanism. 14 Specifically, states are encouraged to 
adopt and adapt an approach developed by the Labor Department (U.S. 
Department of Labor 1994). This method uses a two-step process to 
identify dislocated workers. In the first step, non-job-attached claim 
ants are identified; in the second, a probability of exhaustion is esti 
mated for each claimant, on the basis of education, job tenure, industry, 
occupation, and other variables. Those with the highest probabilities of 
exhaustion are considered the target group. States that do not have suf 
ficient data to estimate such models are expected to use a fixed set of 
screens to identify dislocated workers (as was done in the New Jersey 
demonstration), but they are encouraged and provided with technical 
assistance to develop statistical profiling models as more data become 
available.
Identifying dislocated workers is the first step in helping these indi 
viduals become reemployed; strengthening linkages to reemployment 
services is the second step. For this reason, the worker profiling legisla 
tion requires state UI systems to refer profiled claimants to reemploy 
ment services. Referred claimants are expected to participate in 
reemployment services as a condition of eligibility for UI unless they
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have already done so or have a justifiable cause for failure to partici 
pate.
To make these requirements operational, states are expected to 
establish agreements between the UI system and service providers (the 
ES or EDWAA programs), so that profiled claimants can be referred to 
a provider and receive services. Service providers in each locality gen 
erally hold initial orientation sessions with claimants, followed by 
assessment sessions in which individual assistance plans are developed 
for each claimant. Participation in reemployment services identified in 
the plans is a condition for continued UI eligibility. In addition to ori 
entation and assessment, reemployment services can include counsel 
ing, job search assistance (such as workshops), referrals to jobs and job 
placement, and other similar types of help, but they do not include 
training or education. Claimants can be referred to training or educa 
tional services; if they participate, they do not have to take part in other 
reemployment services. However, engaging in training or education is 
not a mandatory component of the service plans. So that UI can moni 
tor and evaluate the reemployment services participation requirement 
and continuing eligibility, states are expected to develop feedback 
mechanisms to provide UI with information about whether referred 
claimants participate in and complete mandated services.
All states have now put these Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Services (WPRS) systems into effect. In late 1994, Delaware, Florida, 
Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, and Oregon began implementing 
WPRS systems, while other states began implementation in 1995 and 
early 1996. Each of the initial six states successfully developed part 
nerships among the UI, ES, and EDWAA systems, a method to profile 
and refer long-duration claimants to reemployment services, and a way 
to provide feedback to the UI system from the service providers 
(Hawkins et al. 1996). In most localities, the ES is the primary provider 
for mandatory reemployment services, with short duration services 
being emphasized on individual service plans. Lengthier, more exten 
sive assistance is given less frequently and generally on a voluntary 
basis. Such help is often provided through referrals to EDWAA.
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Unemployment Insurance Benefit Restructuring Initiatives
Two other relatively recent UI system initiatives are, like the WPRS 
systems, designed to promote employment of claimants. 15 These initia 
tives—short-time compensation and self-employment assistance— 
restructure the UI benefit system to increase employment and, in the 
second case, to provide additional services to claimants.
Short-Time Compensation
Short-time compensation (STC) allows firms to adjust their work 
force in response to business fluctuations without resorting to layoffs. 16 
Under STC, firms reduce use of their workforce simply by requiring a 
group of employees—typically more than would otherwise be laid 
off—to work shorter weeks. These workers are compensated for their 
lost work time with partial UI benefits. STC may neutralize what some 
have viewed as a pro-layoff bias in regular state UI programs, which 
tend to be relatively restrictive in the payment of partial benefits (Feld- 
stein 1976). 17 Under STC, UI benefits can be paid under a much 
broader set of conditions than in the normal program. As implemented 
in the United States, STC is viewed as a workforce stabilization plan, 
used during periods of economic downturn that are expected to have 
only short-term effects on the labor needs of employers.
STC programs were introduced in the United States in 1978, when 
California implemented its Work Sharing Unemployment Insurance 
program as an experimental effort to mitigate the public-sector 
employment problems that were expected to accompany declines in 
state revenue resulting from tax reductions. The California plan has 
been the prototype for other STC initiatives in this country. The 1981- 
1982 recession acted as a catalyst for expansion of STC programs, 
which were established by states throughout the 1980s. As of 1994, 
STC programs had been implemented in seventeen states, although 
many of these programs have modest activity.
Because state STC programs were grafted onto the existing UI sys 
tem, and because many followed model legislation prepared by the 
U.S. Department of Labor, the programs have many similarities. All 
are implemented by a work-sharing plan for a given employer that, 
once approved, remains in effect for a set period. These plans specify
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the hours reduction and the handling of fringe benefits during the 
period. State laws limit the number of weeks STC can be collected and 
indicate how benefits are to be calculated, usually as a proportion of 
the weekly UI benefit for which the worker is eligible. State plans also 
specify how STC benefits are charged to an employer. In many states, 
they are charged in exactly the same way as regular UI benefits. Early 
concern about the budgetary impact of STC on state trust funds, how 
ever, caused some states to adopt special charging provisions and even 
surtaxes for firms using the program. However, because of the modest 
use of STC, only a few states retain these provisions.
Participation in STC is low in states with a program. Kerachsky, 
Nicholson, and Hershey (1986) showed that firm participation in STC 
was less than 0.5 percent of all employers in the three states (Arizona, 
California, and Oregon) studied. Work by Vroman (1992) indicated 
that STC use continued to be low, generally accounting for no more 
than 0.3 percent of UI claimants.
Findings from the Kerachsky, Nicholson, and Hershey (1986) study 
also suggest that STC has a clear but limited impact on layoffs. As 
expected, participation in STC did reduce layoffs: approximately 13 
percent fewer hours were spent on layoffs by workers in STC firms 
than by workers in comparison firms. Even firms using STC continued 
to use layoffs as their primary method of work force reduction, how 
ever. Nearly 80 percent of all the compensated hours of unemployment 
among workers in these firms were spent on layoff rather than on STC- 
compensated hours reduction. In addition, total compensated unem 
ployment was nearly 11 percent higher among STC users than among 
otherwise similar employers. These findings tend to refute the notion 
that STC hours simply substitute for hours spent on regular UI. 
Instead, the effect of STC on the trade-off between layoffs and hour 
reductions appears to be more complex. An ongoing study is currently 
evaluating this effect and related issues associated with STC.
Self-Employment Assistance
Another policy option that expands services to UI claimants and 
encourages reemployment is self-employment assistance. Under the 
traditional UI system, claimants must be able and available for work 
and must conduct an active job search for wage and salary employ-
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ment, so those who work full-time on starting their own business are 
generally ineligible for UI. Clearly, this policy creates a disincentive to 
self-employment. However, recent legislation has offered states the 
option of changing this situation. Title V of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act (Public Law [P.L.] 
103-181) allows states to offer self-employment assistance as an addi 
tional tool to help speed the transition of dislocated workers into new 
employment. 18 Under this option, eligible claimants who want to estab 
lish their own business are paid a self-employment allowance equiva 
lent to their UI benefit. These claimants are expected to work full-time 
on starting their own business and are exempted from UI work search 
requirements. In addition, they are allowed to retain any earnings from 
self-employment, without losing their self-employment allowance. The 
effect of the new law is to remove the barrier that disallowed payment 
of UI benefits to claimants pursuing full-time self-employment. States 
are also required to provide self-employment assistance activities to 
claimants receiving self-employment allowances. 19 Participation in 
these services is mandatory for recipients of the allowance, and total 
participation cannot exceed 5 percent of regular UI claimants. To date, 
ten states have enacted self-employment programs for UI claimants, 
and programs are operational in Maine, New York, Oregon, Delaware, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and California.
The legislation allowing self-employment was a response to the rel 
atively positive findings on impacts from two random assignment dem 
onstrations conducted in Washington and Massachusetts. These results 
indicated that self-employment is a viable reemployment option for a 
small proportion of UI claimants. Both demonstrations provided self- 
employment allowances and additional assistance activities to claim 
ants who completed a set of initial intake activities. In Washington, the 
self-employment allowance was offered as a lump-sum payment equal 
to the amount of the claimant's remaining UI entitlement; in Massa 
chusetts, claimants were offered weekly allowances equal to their UI 
benefit amount.20 Four percent of targeted claimants in Washington and 
2 percent in Massachusetts completed the initial intake activities and 
were determined eligible for participation in the program. In terms of 
impacts on economic outcomes, the availability of self-employment 
assistance generated an increase in self-employment and an increase in 
time employed among claimants in both demonstrations. Impacts on
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total earnings (from self-employment and wages and salaries) and on 
total benefits paid (regular UI payments plus self-employment allow 
ances) were mixed. In the Washington program, total earnings did not 
rise—the increase in self-employment income was offset by a reduc 
tion in wage and salary income—while in Massachusetts both self- 
employment and wage and salary income rose. The Washington pro 
gram, which paid lump-sum allowances, also increased total benefits 
paid by about $1,000 per eligible claimant while the Massachusetts 
self-employment program reduced total benefits paid during the benefit 
year by about $900 per eligible claimant. Both programs were cost 
effective from the participant and societal perspectives, but only the 
Massachusetts program was cost effective from the governmental per 
spective. The Massachusetts model of paying weekly allowances equal 
to the UI weekly benefit amount has been adopted in the national legis 
lation.
Conclusion
The UI system is intended to provide income support to experienced 
workers who become unemployed involuntarily and, through referrals 
to the ES, assistance in becoming reemployed; however, other public 
and private programs also provide income support and reemployment 
assistance to jobless workers. The presence of this wider set of social 
insurance, public assistance, and reemployment programs must be con 
sidered in an assessment of the adequacy of the income support and 
reemployment assistance provided to unemployed workers. The exist 
ence of these other programs also raises the question of whether they 
are well coordinated with UI. These issues have been examined in this 
chapter.
Income Support
The examination of social insurance, public assistance, and private 
programs that may provide income support to unemployed workers 
showed that, in general, overlaps in coverage are small. Few UI claim 
ants appear to be eligible for or to receive income from social insur-
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ance, public assistance, or private programs designed to provide 
income to older, disabled, or low-income individuals or families. How 
ever, a substantial percentage of unemployed workers appear to be eli 
gible for severance or termination pay (in 1993, 42 percent of full time 
employees in medium and small firms were eligible for severance pay). 
In addition, a significant share receives income from the EITC (in 
1993, 22 percent of the tax returns reporting unemployment compensa 
tion income also reported tax credits or payments under the EITC).
These findings indicate that the gaps in the income support provided 
by the UI system to low-wage workers and the long-term unemployed 
identified in earlier chapters, are not filled by other income support 
programs. Severance pay is more often available to workers with 
higher than with lower wages, and it tends to have a short duration; fur 
ther, the amount of income provided by the EITC is modest (the annual 
average payment or tax credit in 1993 was about $1,000). Other than 
UI, sources of income support are generally not available to the UI 
population.
The analysis in this chapter also suggests that another important gap 
in support to the unemployed is for health insurance. Relatively few 
unemployed individuals, particularly among the long-term unem 
ployed, are likely to have health insurance coverage. While current leg 
islation requires employers to permit laid-off workers to purchase 
health insurance coverage for up to eighteen months at a cost equal to 
102 percent of the employer-employee premium, few UI claimants are 
likely to be able to afford this increasingly costly benefit.
Finally, rules providing for the coordination of benefits from UI and 
other programs have been established for state UI programs. For public 
programs, these regulations often offset the benefits from one program 
by those from another so that an individual will not receive multiple 
benefits, although certain states permit the payment of some multiple 
benefits if the individual meets UI able and available requirements. 
Rules for the coordination of private sources of income with UI have 
also been established. These criteria vary by state as well and are simi 
lar to the stipulations governing income from public programs. How 
ever, in some states, the treatment of different kinds of private income 
seems inconsistent. For example, certain states treat wages in lieu of 
notice and severance payments as disqualifying income for UI while 
income from SUB payments is ignored in the UI benefit calculation.
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Instead, it seems more reasonable to ignore all private sources of 
income in the benefit calculation and to use the UI work test to ensure 
that claimants are available and looking for work and are hence eligible 
for UI.
Reemployment Assistance
Historically, the UI system has provided reemployment assistance to 
UI claimants through the ES and through referrals from the ES to pro 
grams like EDWAA for dislocated workers. However, in the past, few 
claimants received intensive reemployment assistance from the ES or 
from other sources, despite the fact that increasing numbers of claim 
ants are permanently separated from their pre-UI employers and might 
benefit from services. Growth over the years in other indicators of 
worker dislocation, such as the proportion of the jobless who are long- 
term unemployed and the UI exhaustion rate, also points to a greater 
need for reemployment assistance for UI claimants.
There has also been evidence from recent demonstrations that an 
increased level of reemployment services coupled with a participation 
requirement could lead to more rapid reemployment of UI claimants 
and to lower UI benefit payments. The combination of factors that have 
been described has led to legislation requiring states to implement 
WPRS systems. Under these systems, states are expected to identify 
permanently separated claimants who are likely to experience long 
spells of unemployment and to refer them to reemployment services 
from the ES or another service provider. Referred claimants are sup 
posed to participate in reemployment services such as job search assis 
tance as a condition of continued UI eligibility, unless they have 
already done so or have a justifiable cause for failure to participate. 
States are also expected to develop feedback mechanisms to provide 
UI with information about whether referred claimants participate in 
required services.
Early indications suggest that these WPRS systems can be imple 
mented successfully. If sufficient resources are available to provide 
reemployment services, these systems should lead to an increase in the 
level of reemployment services provided to UI claimants and to 
increased coordination between UI and reemployment service provid 
ers. Other recent UI initiatives—short-time compensation and self-
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employment allowances—are also aimed at promoting the employ 
ment of claimants. Short-time compensation is intended to strengthen 
ties with existing employers by providing an alternative to temporary 
layoffs, and self-employment assistance is designed to help claimants 
develop an alternative to wage and salary work.
NOTES
I am grateful to Sheldon Danziger, Walter Nicholson, and the editors for their comments on 
this paper and to Cmdy Castro for her help in producing the paper
1 These firms account for approximately one-quarter of all employment
2 For convenience, the fifty-three UI jurisdictions—the fifty states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, are called "states."
3 The decline in employment in automobile and other manufacturing industries has also led 
to a decline in the number of workers covered under SUB plans. Haber and Murray (1966) report 
that over 2.5 million workers were covered by SUB plans in 1962, while the 1993 survey of bene 
fits in medium and large firms reports that 1 2 million workers are covered.
4. The Social Security Disability Insurance program provides monthly cash benefits to work 
ers under age 65 who become disabled and can no longer work because of the disability Benefits 
become available after a five-month waiting period.
5.In four states, the same agency administers TDI and UI
6. Conversely, few Food Stamp and AFDC program recipients receive UI. In 1988, 2.3 percent 
of Food Stamp households (U S. Department of Agriculture 1990) and 4 3 percent of AFDC fam 
ilies (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1990) had income from UI.
7 These numbers were computed from data reported by the Internal Revenue Service (1995, 
table 2) and from data reported in testimony on the earned income tax credit by the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue (Richardson 1995, table 1)
8. This latter estimate assumed that individuals would not respond to a loss of UI benefits by 
increasing job search activities or by lowering the wage at which they would accept a job Thus, 
this estimate provides an upper-bound poverty rate in the absence of UI
9 As indicated in the previous paragraph, the annual number of dislocated workers was also 
higher during the recession of the early 1990s than in the 1980s.
10. The three studies are Topel (1990, 1991) and Ruhm (1991)
11. Corson and Dynarski use the BLS definition of dislocated workers, which includes work 
ers who lose their jobs because their plants close, their employer went out of business, or they 
were laid off and not recalled
12 EDWAA uses a relatively broad definition of dislocated workers Workers are eligible for 
EDWAA if they have been laid off or have received a notice of termination, are UI eligible, and 
are unlikely to return to their previous industry or occupation, they have been laid off or received 
a notice of termination as a result of a plant closing or substantial layoff, or they are long-term 
unemployed individuals with limited opportunities for reemployment in their occupation.
13. The Detroit evaluation used a comparison plant methodology, whereas the Buffalo and 
Texas evaluations used random assignment methods that differed according to how nonpartici- 
pants were treated
14 Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No 45-93, Field Memorandum No 35-94, and 
other documents in U.S Department of Labor 1994.
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15 A third initiative to promote reemployment—reemployment bonuses—has been tested 
experimentally, but legislation permitting states to incorporate reemployment bonuses in their UI 
programs has not been enacted For a discussion of reemployment bonuses, see chapter 7.
16 Short-time compensation is also referred to as work sharing or shared-work compensation
17. Most states have partial benefit schedules that specify a dollar-for-dollar reduction in ben 
efits for wages in excess of a modest weekly earnings disregard. For a typical worker, these sched 
ules usually mean that no benefits are paid if the employee works two or more days per week
18. This legislation has a five-year time limit, but pending legislation would make permanent 
the provisions permitting states to provide self-employment allowances and assistance
19 Self-employment activities that must be offered include entrepreneurial training, business 
counseling, and technical assistance This assistance is most often provided through state eco 
nomic development agencies
20 For a description of the Washington and Massachusetts demonstrations and a discussion of 
the results, see Benus et al (1995). See also Wilson (1995) for comparisons to programs in other 
countries.
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